Short-term update: in zerohedge as well, and sequel article here! Better yet, today the Fed doubles-down on their schtick, and announces that our current 2nd quarter GDP is runnng at >4%. These economists make election pollsters look good.
There is a 2/3 chance that both competing Federal Reserve 2017 Q1 GDP nowcasts are wrong! That’s an audacious prediction for the storied NY and Atlanta institutions (one of them led by my former big boss Timothy Geithner), and yet there is no way around the current confusion they are in. This is also critically important as one is showing a robust 3.2% growth reading, while the other is at 0.9% (the 2nd lowest reading in nearly 3-years) and essentially indicates that we are descending towards recession. Are we descending towards recession? It's unlikely but zero-growth is certainly in the cards and not reflected by these two nowcasts, and we certainly think there is only a single digit probability of a >3% GDP. How could the NY Fed plausibly give such a madly high estimate (which if true would be the second highest in 2-years)? Yet there you have it, two extreme readings, and a 2.3% (3.2%-0.9%) chasm between them. We show here that the Federal Reserve’s conclusions are somewhat ridiculous, though shouldn’t be since they impact the open market committee monetary decisions that the world looks to. And there are humbling lessons from these nascent Big Data, overfit models.
There is a 2/3 chance that both competing Federal Reserve 2017 Q1 GDP nowcasts are wrong! That’s an audacious prediction for the storied NY and Atlanta institutions (one of them led by my former big boss Timothy Geithner), and yet there is no way around the current confusion they are in. This is also critically important as one is showing a robust 3.2% growth reading, while the other is at 0.9% (the 2nd lowest reading in nearly 3-years) and essentially indicates that we are descending towards recession. Are we descending towards recession? It's unlikely but zero-growth is certainly in the cards and not reflected by these two nowcasts, and we certainly think there is only a single digit probability of a >3% GDP. How could the NY Fed plausibly give such a madly high estimate (which if true would be the second highest in 2-years)? Yet there you have it, two extreme readings, and a 2.3% (3.2%-0.9%) chasm between them. We show here that the Federal Reserve’s conclusions are somewhat ridiculous, though shouldn’t be since they impact the open market committee monetary decisions that the world looks to. And there are humbling lessons from these nascent Big Data, overfit models.
The chart here shows some basic
information regarding the current GDP nowcasts.
As we via the two blue bars, we have the Atlanta nowcast on the left (the
bar was recently as high as 3.4% earlier this year). And the NY nowcast on the right (the bar was recently
as low as 1.5%). That’s right, both nowcasts
passed each other, while aggressively
moving further in the opposite direction!
The large swings in each are also doubtful, given each nowcast’s eventually
advertised, margin of error (concordant paradigm in various forecasts by Taleb). For a good chronology
of these nowcast reports, refer to MishTalk.
Each nowcast boasts a
margin of error of just ~1%, and this clearly poses an issue since the average
of these two nowcasts (shown in orange at 2.1%) is clearly outside of both the
Atlanta and the NY stated margin of error!
As supportive reference, we also show (in green) that the current 2016
Q4 GDP is nearby at 1.9%. Now we should
ask some important questions about how we keep getting into more strange
nowcasts in the past year that they both have operated. The first thing to appreciate is that the
nowcasts are supposed to predict very tight errors that are uncorrelated to the
variance in the actual GDP itself. And
good nowcasts should have errors independent of one another, except since the
NY and Atlanta Fed operate independent of one another there is a good chance
that there may be some modeling similarities.
We modestly assume this and derive through the variance formula (VarianceAtlanta+VarianceNY+2σAtlantaσNYρAtlanta,NY)
that the margin of error of the difference
between the models is just less than 1% (silver vertical interval arrows in
chart above). This is a highly plausible
tight expected variance. Sample size is also trivial here as we don't have the true expectation to model a limit from. And with this,
the probability of seeing an inadvertent 2.3% difference between the two correct
Federal Reserve models is <5%. Or that their publicized margin of error
is awkwardly too low (to the point we’ll show later that randomly guessing the GDP
would be safer).
We also have the probability
that one of the nowcasts is correct, which due to symmetry means applying one
of the nowcast stated margin of errors to the other nowcast value. Or that the one nowcast is unintentionally
correct, which would be like the <5% probability above. So, in total the probability of one of the
Federal Reserve nowcasts being correct and the other being wrong is ~10% (not
the >½ that many may generously
assume as they critique these divergent outputs).
That leaves us with two other possible
outcomes still! That is to split up the
remaining 85% probability that both
models are individually wrong into: (a) the average of the two models is
still correct, and (b) even the average of both models is wrong. This leaves us with no choice but to conclude
that the probability that there is ~40% probability that the correct 2016 Q1
GDP is nowhere near either nowcasts nor the
average of the two, and a >½ probability that the GDP is near the 2.1%
average that inappropriately happens to
be well outside both two nowcasts’ margin of error. And between those two we can safely claim
that there is a 2/3 chance that both
models are total wrong (and merely <5%
chance they are still both right). There
is perhaps a 30% chance one can smartly use both models in a deliberate way,
though this is conditional on how they use the information and not at their endorsed
specified face value.
Now a more practical
assumption of this is that the margins of error should be more than doubled (to 2.6%!), in which case no one would even use
such nowcast models. However, the probability
breakdown in such a scenario is this:
- <30% chance both models -with their current 2.3% chasm- are correct
- ~60% chance one of the models is wrong and one is correct
- ~10% chance both models are still wrong individually, though the average in rare cases is correct
But there is still 50% of the data to come out for the quarter. These metrics aren't expected to be within a certain margin at every time before the Advance release at the end of April.
ReplyDeleteThanks for the comment. There is some data to come though it is not necessarily error reducing to justify the high volatility in these changes. Just today the NY Fed finally lowered their 3.2% GDP to high 2% range, as prophesied in this article. There was no chance we’d really see a 3% or higher range on Q1 GDP. Also you are incorrect on the margin of error since they claim in their working papers that their product retains almost the same >1% lower-bound same through to the report (end of April). This is also accurately stated in this article above. The point of course is that the GDP itself has a lower error than these stated forecast errors, and their stated forecast errors are egregiously wrong, which is why we even have two Fed estimates so far off from one another, a little more than a month before the report. Not so tough to see the problem!
DeleteCould you defend your conclusion that the average is most likely wrong.
ReplyDeleteRemember, over time, the consensus economic forecast -- an average of multiple forecast -- is generally closer to the actual outcome than any individual forecast.
Hi Spencer, thanks. The answer is the same way we aggressively defended a prescient forecast that the election poll of polls (the average) way wrong in estimating that Hillary Clinton had a ~90% chance of winning the election. And you are incorrect that the average probability forecast -over time- is closer to actual than individual forecasts. This works in theory of course with properly fitted and independent models. Doesn’t work in many cases – the point of this statistical workout on this article – when individual forecasts are often collectively biased and have revolting margin of errors! Read this carefully from rockstar math professor, and follower, Nassim Taleb: https://twitter.com/nntaleb/status/796704922838401024
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